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Idaho Code Section 18-7042
•  A person commits the crime of interference with agricultural 
production if the person knowingly:
–  (a) Is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters an 
agricultural production facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or 
trespass;
–  (b) Obtains records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat, 
misrepresentation or trespass;
–  (c) Obtains employment with an agricultural production facility by force, 
threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other 
injury to the facility’s operations, livestock, crops, owners, personnel, 
equipment, buildings, premises, business interests or customers;
–  (d) Enters an agricultural production facility that is not open to the public 
and, without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial 
process or statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings of 
the conduct of an agricultural production facility’s operations….
Statutory Summary
•  Targets Two Types of Activity
–  Crime to make a misrepresentation when requesting a tour, 
obtaining records, or seeking employment
–  Crime to videotape or audio-record at an ag facility without 
permission 
–  (In addition to normal tort/trespass type actions)
•  Penalty
–  Felony Offense punishable by up to a year in prison
–  Liable for twice business economic loss
ALDF Legal Challenge
•  ALDF argued that Section 18-7042 has the purpose and 
effect of stifling public debate about agriculture by:
–  (1) Criminalizing employment-based undercover operations;
–  (2) Criminalizing investigative journalism and whistleblowing.
•  Constitutional Challenges
–  First Amendment
–  Equal Protection Clause
•  Federal Preemption
Idaho Law Unconstitutional
•  Idaho Federal District Court
–  Section 18-7042 violates the First Amendment
–  Section 18-7042 Violates the Equal Protection Clause
First Amendment Background
•  Overview
–  1st Amendment: protects freedoms of speech, press, religion
–  Extended to States under incorporation doctrine by Gitlow v. NY 
(1925)
–  Government shall make “no law” abridging the freedom of 
speech
–  Some categories of “low-value” speech are not protected: 
defamation, libel, obscenity, fraud.
First Amendment Analysis
•  Is it Speech? Or Conduct?
•  Is it Content-Based?
•  Does the Gvmt have ample justification?
–  If CB, strict scrutiny: compelling governmental interest and 
narrowly tailored
–  If not CB, a balancing test of sorts: must be a substantial 
governmental interest, must be narrowly tailored, and must leave 
open alternative avenues for communication.
–  Time, Place, and Manner restrictions are ok, i.e., no speech 
within a reasonable abortion-clinic buffer zone.
United States v. Alvarez
•  Xavier Alvarez attended a water district meeting, and 
introduced himself: "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I 
retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded 
the Congressional Medal of Honor."
•  The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely 
claim receipt of military decorations or medals. 
•  Penalties increased for the Medal of Honor
United States v. Alvarez (Plurality)
•  Stolen Valor Act violates the First Amendment
–  Government argued that false speech was entitled to no 
protection.
–  Court disagreed, holding that a statute that targets falsity, and 
nothing more, had not been decided by case law; precedent 
concerned cases about defamation, fraud, or another legally 
cognizable harm. 
–  Stolen Valor Act sought to control and suppress all false 
statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and 
settings without regard to whether the lie was made for the 
purpose of material gain.
United States v. Alvarez (Concurrence)
•  False statements enjoy little 1st Amendment protection, but not zero.
•  False statements are less likely that true factual statements to make 
a valuable contribution to the marketplace of ideas; government 
often has good reason to prohibit such speech.
•  Applied a balancing test or “Intermediate Scrutiny”
–  examine the fit between statutory ends and means, taking into account the 
seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the 
nature and importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the 
extent to which the statute will tend to achieve those objectives, and 
whether there are other, less restrictive alternatives. “Intermediate scrutiny” 
describes this approach. Although the Court has frequently said or implied 
that false factual 
–  Statute Fails Under 1st Amendment because too broad
United States v. Alvarez (Dissent)
•  False speech is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection.
Two Questions in Otter
•  Do the misrepresentation provisions violate the First 
Amendment under Alvarez?
•  Do the recording provisions violate the First Amendment, 
at least as applied to employees?
Otter: Content-Based Restrictions
•  § 18-7042 is “is a content-based restriction” to which the 
highest level of scrutiny applies. 
–  § 18-7042 “targets undercover investigators who intend to 
publish videos they make through the press and seeks to 
suppress speech critical of animal agricultural practices.”
–  Not intended to protect private property
Misrepresentation Provisions Violate 1st Am.
•  Otter Court: Alvarez held that the government may 
criminalize false statements only when those statements 
themselves cause a “legally cognizable harm.”
–  Here, however, Idaho has done nothing to show the lies it seeks 
to prohibit cause any legally cognizable harm. 
–  Section 18-7042 does not limit its misrepresentation prohibition 
to false speech amounting to actionable fraud, defamation, 
conversion, or trespass. 
–  Rather, it sweeps into its prohibition all lies used to gain access 
to property, records, or employment—regardless of whether the 
misrepresentations themselves cause any material harm. 
Suspect (Highly!) Because …
•  Alvarez plurality: false claims “made to . . . secure 
moneys or other valuable considerations, say offers of 
employment,” are not protected.
•  If you count votes, 5 Justices found false statements to 
have little (or no) speech value.
•  There is no question of harm, here: Trespass is the 
quintessential harm to private property.
•  If such actions can constitutionally be treated as a tort, 
they can constitutionally be treated as a crime.
The Recording Provision
•  Otter: Unconstitutional because audio-visual recordings 
are “purely expressive activity”
–  § 18-7042 facially discriminates based on content because it 
only targets speech concerning the “conduct of an agricultural 
production facility’s operations” 
–  The evidence also indicates that § 18-7042’s underlying purpose 
is to silence animal activists.
Suspect Because …
•  Law concerning audio-visual is more nuanced than Court 
let’s on.
•  Legislative history probably off-limits because of O’Brien.
Unsettled Law Re: Videotaping
•  No Supreme Court decision directly addresses a 
photographer/videographer’s First Amendment rights. 
–  1st Amendment has been extended to conduct “sufficiently imbued 
with elements of communication”
–  Hurley (1995): “To achieve First Amendment protection, a plaintiff 
must show that he possessed: (1) a message to be communicated; 
and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of the 
medium in which the message is to be expressed.” 
–  Such speech (or conduct like videotaping) is protected in the “public 
forum.”
–  Even so, as the ACLU website explains: On private property, the 
owner can set the rules regarding videotaping.
Content Neutral?
•  Idaho: content neutral because it does not regulate 
speech based on what is said (i.e. content) but instead 
on where it is said, i.e. at an agricultural production 
facility. 
–  In McCullen, the Supreme Court held that buffer zones outside 
of abortion clinics are content neutral. “Whether petitioners 
violate the Act depends not on what they say . . . but simply on 
where they say it. 
–  § 18-7042 prosecuted only if content of ag operations.
Strict Scrutiny
•  No compelling interest
–  Court misreads Alvarez (again!)
–  No compelling interest in protecting private property.
•  Not narrowly tailored 





–  Suspect Class = Heightened Scrutiny
–  Non-suspect Class = Rational Basis Review
•  Is there a classification?
•  Court: Section 18-7042 discriminates on its face by classifying between whistleblowers 
in the agricultural industry and whistleblowers in other industries. 
•  Rationally related?
–  The State contends that the purpose of § 18-7042 is to protect the private 
property of agricultural facility owners by guarding against such dangers as 
trespass, conversion, and fraud. But the State fails to explain why already 
existing laws against trespass, conversion, and fraud do not already serve this 
purpose
–  Likewise, the State fails to provide a legitimate explanation for why 
agricultural production facilities deserve more protection from these crimes than 
other private businesses. 
Real Rational Basis Review
•  State need not proffer explanation
•  It is “entirely irrelevant” what end the government is 
actually seeking 
•  Statutes can be based on “rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”
•  Courts obligated to seek out conceivable reasons for 
validating challenged laws 
•  Courts can hypothesize legitimate interests.
Key to the Decision
•  Animal agriculture is a heavily-regulated industry and food 
production and safety are matters of the utmost public concern. 
•  “Speech on matters of public concern . . . is at the heart of the First 
Amendment's protection.”
•  Substantive Due Process Review: 
•  “The day is gone when this court uses the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws … because they may 
be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of 
thought.”
Bottom-Line
•  Misrepresentation provisions are aimed at specific torts/
crimes and satisfy the Alvarez harm standard.
•  Videotaping provision may be content-based, and thus 
may require some special justification. 
•  To the extent, the Court suggests a First Amendment 
right to lie to video on private property, incorrect. This 
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